

## Impacts of U.S. Tariff Measures on Thailand's Trade and Economy



Under President Trump's Second Term (Trump 2.0), the United States has made a significant shift in its trade policy. A series of tariff measures have been introduced as a strategic tool to exert pressure on key trading partners. In his address to Congress on March 5, 2025, President Trump reaffirmed his administration's intention to implement reciprocal tariffs against countries that maintain a trade surplus with the United States — most notably China, Canada, and Mexico. In addition, targeted import tariffs have been introduced on goods deemed critical to the protection of domestic industries. These include the steel and aluminum industries with a universal import tariff of 25% imposed on all countries, effective March 12, 2025; the energy sector with a 10% import tariff specifically targeting Canadian energy products took effect on April 2, 2025; and the automotive industry, where the U.S. government announced on March 27, 2025, a 25% import tariff on all vehicles manufactured outside the United States, including key components such as engines, transmissions, and drivetrains. This measure also went into effect on April 2, 2025.

On April 1, 2025, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) published the 2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, which outlines significant trade barriers imposed by various countries — including Thailand — that are perceived to hinder U.S. trade and undermine competitive fairness. The report addresses not only import tariffs, but also laws, regulations, and policies that the U.S. government considers restrictive. According to the report, Thailand applies an average tariff rate of 9.8% under the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) framework to imports from the United States as of 2023. In addition, the USTR highlights several non-tariff barriers (NTBs) implemented by Thailand that are regarded as traderestrictive measures against U.S. exports. These include (1) Import restrictions on biofuels aimed at supporting domestic farmers, notably the ban on ethanol imports for fuel use, which has been in place since 2005; (2) Import licensing requirements for a wide range of products, including wood, petroleum, machinery, textiles, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, food items, and certain agricultural products; (3) Inspection fees for food safety compliance on both cooked and uncooked imported meat products; and (4) Concern over potential corruption among customs officials due to the policy of offering incentive-based rewards to officers. Moreover, the report identifies several technical barriers to trade (TBTs), including a proposed regulation restricting the marketing of infant foods, which has caused concern for U.S. dairy exporters. Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are also cited, including mandatory inspections of facilities exporting animal-based products, restrictions on bovine offal treated with beta-agonists, and a ban on U.S. pork imports due to the absence of established Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) for ractopamine in Thailand.

On April 2, 2025, the United States government officially announced the implementation of reciprocal tariffs on over 60 countries with significant trade surpluses with the U.S., a move that exceeded earlier expectations. Prior to this, many observers anticipated that President Trump would limit the tariffs to a targeted group of countries referred to as the "Dirty 15". This group includes China, Mexico, Vietnam, Ireland, Germany, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Canada, India, Thailand, Italy, Switzerland, Malaysia, and Indonesia.



Thailand was ranked 11th among the "Dirty 15" based on the value of its trade surplus with the United States in 2024. Under the new implemented reciprocal tariff, Thailand will be subject to a 37% tariff rate. However, the latest data from the Trade Policy and Strategy Office (TPSO), Ministry of Commerce, indicates that the actual rate applicable to Thailand—as stated in Annex I of the relevant Executive Order—may be as high as 37%. Among ASEAN countries, Thailand's rate is lower than that of Cambodia (49%), Laos (48%), Vietnam (46%), and Myanmar (45%), but higher than Indonesia (32%), Malaysia (24%), Brunei (24%), the Philippines (18%), and Singapore (10%). These reciprocal tariffs will take effect on April 9, 2025, and will apply exclusively to goods that are classified as having less than 20% U.S.-origin content. In other words, the measures will target imports whose U.S.-sourced components constitute less than one-fifth of the product's total value.

In addition to the reciprocal tariffs, the U.S. government has also announced the imposition of a Baseline Tariff of 10% on all imported goods from all countries, effective April 5, 2025. This tariff applies broadly across product categories but excludes items previously subjected to specific tariff measures — such as steel and steel products, aluminum and aluminum products, as well as automotive and parts, which are already subject to a 25% import tariff. Several product categories have been granted temporary exemptions from the baseline tariff, including copper and copper products, pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, semiconductors, lumber, gold bullion, energy products, and certain critical minerals. However, these categories may be subject to future tariff actions depending on subsequent policy announcements. Concurrently, President Trump also signed an executive order repealing the De Minimis threshold for duty-free treatment of low-value shipments (under USD 800) originating from China and Hong Kong. This repeal will take effect on May 2, 2025.

Figure 1: The United States' Announcement of Reciprocal Tariffs on Trading Partners on April 2, 2025

## Latest Update on Trump's Tariff (data as of 4 Apr)




## 1 Apr

- USTR released the "2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers," highlighting significant trade barriers faced by the U.S. in various countries, including Thailand.
- Thailand's key non-tariff barriers (NTBs) implemented to US included restrictions on biofuel imports, import licensing requirement on various products, food safety inspection fees and some restrictions on imported meet, etc.

## 2 Apr

- U.S. government announced a reciprocal tariff on more than 60 countries with significant trade surpluses against US, effective 9 April 2025.
- In addition, U.S. government announced a baseline tariff of 10% on imports from all countries, effective 5 April 2025 and repeal the "De Minimis" rule, which exempted imports valued under \$800 from tariffs for goods from China and Hong Kong, effective 2 May.
- Thailand will face a reciprocal tariff of 37%, following other ASEAN countries like Cambodia (49%), Laos (48%), Vietnam (46%), and Myanmar (45%).



Source: LH Bank Business Research analysis based on data from USTR, Capital Economics, Goldman Sachs (Data as of April 4, 2025)

Following the announcement of U.S. tariff measures, various countries have expressed different stances and degrees of preparedness in response to the anticipated impacts. The government of Japan voiced serious concern over the U.S. tariff measures and immediately initiated negotiations to seek exemptions for key

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products, including automotives and steel. Furthermore, Japan has prepared support measures for affected companies, including liquidity assistance and adjustments to the minimum wage to mitigate the economic impact. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce, facing a tariff rate of over 34%, issued a strong response by calling for the immediate withdrawal of the U.S. tariff measures and threatening to impose retaliatory tariffs at the same 34% rate to protect the country's interests, with implementation set for April 10, 2025. As for Thailand, on April 6, 2025, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra issued two official statements and gave media interviews outlining the government's short- and long-term response measures. These include assistance for affected businesses, adjustment to Thailand's import tariff structure, promote businesses to identify new export markets, and the setting of a dedicated negotiation team to engage the U.S. on key issues. These issues include increasing imports of U.S. products—particularly in the energy, aerospace, and agricultural sectors—enhancing trade cooperation with the U.S. to reduce trade barriers, and cracking down on products falsely claiming Thai origin to enter the U.S. market.

## **@** Analysis:

## Impacts on the Global and Thai Economies

The U.S. tariff measures have triggered severe, immediate, and widespread disruption in the global economic and financial markets. Global equity markets experienced sharp selloffs, with the Dow Jones Futures plunging by more than 1,000 points. Asian stock markets saw steep declines, while European markets also opened significantly lower. Crude oil prices (WTI) dropped by over 3%, reflecting concerns over a potential global economic slowdown and a consequent reduction in energy demand. Conversely, gold prices surged past USD 3,200 per ounce — reaching a historic high — as investors sought safe-haven assets amid heightened economic uncertainty. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had previously estimated that a 10% increase in U.S. tariffs involving the United States, China, and Europe could lead to a contraction in global GDP by approximately 0.8% — down from a baseline forecast of 3.3% as of January 2025 — and a contraction in U.S. GDP by around 1.0%, compared to a baseline projection of 2.7% in the same period, by the end of 2025. This would result in an economic loss amounting to several hundred billion U.S. dollars. Simultaneously, global trade volumes are expected to decline significantly as higher import tariffs make goods more expensive, thereby reducing demand. The Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) projects that world trade volumes could decrease by as much as 3.4% by 2030. Countries heavily reliant on exports to the United States are poised to be disproportionately affected, particularly developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs), which face higher tariff rates compared to developed economies (DCs). This could exacerbate economic downturns, elevate unemployment levels, and intensify public debt burdens in vulnerable economies, potentially triggering regional economic crises. While the full impact of reciprocal tariffs remains uncertain, it is anticipated that the U.S. and its trading partners will enter into intensive negotiations aimed at reducing or reversing the tariffs in exchange for long-term trade concessions. Nevertheless, the risk of trade diversion remains significant. Products that were previously destined for the U.S. market may be rerouted to other regions, potentially resulting in oversupply in alternative markets, particularly within ASEAN. This is especially concerning in the case of Chinese goods, which may be redirected to ASEAN markets following diminished access to the U.S., thereby posing heightened risks of regional market saturation.



The U.S. tariff measures also have significant ramifications for the highly interconnected global supply chains, particularly in key industries such as automotive, electronics, and electrical appliances. These disruptions are expected to dampen short-term investment in export-oriented manufacturing due to heightened policy uncertainty surrounding global trade. Furthermore, the elevated cost of imports may encourage a reshoring of production back to the U.S., where domestic manufacturing may become relatively more cost-effective. This could, in turn, stimulate job creation and benefit U.S.-aligned supply chain partners such as Mexico, Canada, India, and Vietnam. In addition, the U.S. tariff actions are likely to exert upward pressure on global inflation. In the short term, higher import costs will contribute to increased inflation rates in both the United States and other countries. This inflationary pressure may compel central banks to maintain tight monetary policies or delay planned interest rate cuts. As a result, the cost of borrowing for businesses and households would remain high, thereby constraining investment and consumption. In particular, the rise in import tariffs will likely accelerate inflation in the U.S., prompting the Federal Reserve (Fed) to adopt a more hawkish monetary stance. These developments could have broader repercussions for emerging markets and the global economy at large.

Regarding the impacts on the Thai economy, under the <u>baseline scenario</u>, it is anticipated that the Thai government will proactively engage in negotiations with the United States to reduce the announced 37% tariff rate. Thailand is expected to propose a range of measures aimed at reducing its trade surplus with the U.S., including tariff reductions on American imports, increased imports of U.S. agricultural and energy products, as well as defense-related and military products. These negotiations could potentially bring the effective tariff rate down to approximately 15% (which is based on assumption as of April 9, 2025). This would result in a projected decline of approximately USD 5 billion in Thai export value, representing a 1.6% share of total exports. As a result, Thailand's GDP growth in 2025 is forecast to decelerate to 2.3%YoY, down from 2.5% in the previous year. On the monetary policy aspect, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is likely to cut the policy interest rate by an additional 50 bps over the remainder of the year. Should the trade negotiations prove less successful than expected, an interest rate cut could be announced as early as the next MPC meeting on April 30, 2025. The Thai baht is expected to experience a depreciation to a range of THB 35.5–36.5 per USD amid heightened volatility in financial and capital markets stemming from U.S. trade actions. Although the weaker baht could partially offset the loss in price competitiveness of Thai exports, it may also increase the cost of imported raw materials and capital goods, thereby contributing to additional inflationary pressure.

In the worst-case scenario — where negotiations between the Thai government and the United States fail, and the U.S. proceeds to impose a 37% import tariff on Thai goods as announced — Thailand's export value is projected to decline by approximately USD 12 billion, representing 3.8% of total exports. In this case, Thai exports could contract by as much as 2.5%, resulting in widespread repercussions for economic activity. Lower capacity utilization would likely lead to a decline in investment in production expansion, while reduced employment would dampen domestic purchasing power, causing GDP growth to slow sharply to 1.7%YoY. Furthermore, should the United States take a hardline stance and refuse to compromise with its trading partners, reciprocal tariffs could be imposed on U.S. exports. This would likely accelerate inflation in the U.S., eroding consumer purchasing power and potentially forcing the Federal Reserve to maintain higher interest rates than previously expected. In turn, this could lead to a significant slowdown in the U.S. economy. In this scenario, the Thai baht is expected to strengthen



slightly relative to the baseline projection, hovering between THB 35.0–35.5 per U.S. dollar, due to shifts in global capital flows. Additionally, the MPC is expected to cut the policy rate by a further 75 bps over the remainder of the year to support economic activity.

In the worst-case scenario, the Thai baht is expected to appreciate slightly, supported by three key factors including 1) Continued weakening of the U.S. dollar - the U.S. tariff hikes, along with strong retaliatory measures by key trade partners such as China — which has responded with a matching 34% tariff on U.S. imports — have heightened the risk of a prolonged trade war. This would undermine consumer and business confidence in the U.S. and increase the likelihood of a slowdown in the U.S. economy. Consequently, the U.S. dollar, which has traditionally held its position as a safe haven asset, may lose some of its credibility; 2) Inverse correlation between gold prices and the Thai baht against the U.S. dollar - during periods of trade wars, gold prices tend to rise. This, in turn, boosts Thailand's gold and gold product exports, increasing demand for the Thai baht and thereby strengthening its value relative to the U.S. dollar; and 3) Widening gap in real interest rates between Thailand and the United States - If the U.S. maintains its hardline tariff stance, including against Thailand, Thai exports could contract by as much as 2.5%. This would significantly dampen domestic demand, prompting MPC to lower the policy interest rate by an additional 75 bps to 1.25%. Although inflation is expected to edge up slightly to around 1.0%, Thailand's real interest rate would remain marginally positive at approximately 0.25%. In contrast, recent market expectations (as of April 8, 2025) suggest that the Federal Reserve may be compelled to cut its policy rate by another 100 bps, bringing it down to 3.25-3.50%. However, the latest University of Michigan survey (March 2025) indicates that U.S. inflation expectations for the next 12 months have surged to 5.0%, suggesting that real interest rates in the U.S. could turn negative.

Figure 2: Impacts of U.S. Reciprocal Tariffs on the Global and Thai Economies

## Initial solutions to mitigate risks

- Trade Negotiations: pressures multiple countries to lower tariffs, potentially leading to fairer global trade and increased trade volumes in the long term.
- Re-shoring (to the US): Higher import costs may shift production back to the US, creating jobs and benefiting the US and countries in the US supply chain (such as Mexico, Canada, India, and Vietnam.)

## Negative Impacts

- The impact of the reciprocal tariff <u>remains uncertain</u>, as the U.S. and its trading partners are likely to engage in intense negotiations in the coming weeks, aiming to reduce or even reverse the tariff increases in exchange for concessions.
- Rising trade policy uncertainty will slow investment in exportoriented manufacturing in the short term until policy clarity emerges.
- The increase in import tariffs would accelerate inflation in the US and make it more likely the Fed to tighten monetary policy.
- A previous IMF study cited that a universal 10% increase in U.S. tariffs, accompanied by retaliatory measures from the Euro area and China, could reduce U.S. GDP by 1% and global GDP by approximately 0.5% through 2026.

## Downside Risks to Thailand's Economy from the reciprocal tariff

	Tariff impacts	Impact value (USD,mn)	% to TH exports to US	% to TH total exports	% to TH GDP
a)	The US increase the tariff rate of 10% on all import goods.	3,198	5.5	1.0	0.6
b)	The U.S. reduced reciprocal tariffs to <u>15%</u> on all import goods	4,797	8.3	1.6	0.9 Base
c)	The U.S. reduced reciprocal tariffs to <u>25%</u> on all import goods	7,994	13.8	2.6	1.5
d)	The U.S. imposed a <u>37%</u> import tariff on all imported goods due to unsatisfactory reciprocal treatment.	11,832	20.4	3.8	2.2 Worst

- In our base case, the Thai government will make its best effort in negotiations to reduce the U.S. trade deficit, including lowering Thailand's import tariffs on U.S. goods and increasing imports of agricultural products and energy from the U.S. As a result, import tariffs are expected to decrease to 15%.
- We reiterate our forecast that the Bank of Thailand will cut its policy rate by an additional 50bps in 2025F. If negotiations do not proceed favorably, the MPC is likely to lower the rate by 25bps at its next meeting on April 30.

Source: LH Bank Business Research analysis based on data from IMF, WTO, BoT and NESDC (Data as of April 4, 2025)

## Impact on Thailand's Trade Sector

The impact of the United States' reciprocal tariff measures, including the increase in other import duties, has had a significant effect on Thailand's trade sector. This can be categorized into 1) <u>Direct</u>

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<u>Impact</u> – This pertains to the effect on Thailand's exports to the U.S. market, where the competitiveness of Thai products has declined due to higher import tariffs. This may result in a loss of market share to competing countries that are not affected by the U.S. reciprocal tariffs or are subject to lower rates than Thailand; and 2) Indirect Impact – The indirect consequences are multifaceted. Key indirect impacts include:

- Impact via the Supply Chain Linked to China: Thailand's significant integration into China's production supply chain means that the effects of the trade war on China have led to reduced demand for intermediate and primary goods imported from Thailand, which are used in the production of exports to the U.S. These include products such as <a href="mailto:cassava">cassava</a>, rubber wood, rubber, synthetic rubber, copper and copper products, computers and equipment, machinery and components, plastic pellets, and aluminum products.
- Impact from the Risk of Chinese Products Flooding ASEAN and Thai Markets: As China faces trade restrictions in the U.S., there is an increasing likelihood of Chinese goods being diverted to ASEAN markets, including Thailand. This will intensify competition in both domestic and international markets, particularly for products such as electrical appliances and components (e.g., refrigerators, washing machines, air conditioners), computers and equipment, automotive parts, machinery and components, petrochemicals (e.g., plastic pellets), and steel and aluminum.
- Impact from Global Economic Slowdown: The global economic slowdown, compounded by trade war and U.S. tariffs, has had a particular effect on key trading partners of Thailand, including China, Japan, ASEAN countries, Australia, and India. This will result in a decline in Thailand's exports of both primary and intermediate goods, as well as final goods, to these markets.
- Impact from Export Shifts to the U.S.: A potential shift in trade direction (Trade Diversion) may occur, where the U.S. could import certain products from Thailand instead of other countries, as Thailand's reciprocal tariff rates are lower. This shift would result in increased price competitiveness for Thai products compared to those from other countries traditionally imported by the U.S.
- Impact from Investment Relocation and Reshoring: The relocation of production bases and the reversal of investment (reshoring) to avoid U.S. tariff impacts could reduce future investment inflows into Thailand in industries affected by these changes.
- Analysis on Direct and Indirect Impacts of U.S. Tariff Measures on Thailand's Trade and Economy
  Direct Impact

In 2024, Thailand's exports to the United States amounted to USD 54.956 billion, accounting for 18.3% of the total export value, which was USD 300.529 billion. The United States remains Thailand's largest export market, a position it has held continuously since 2019. The main export products from Thailand to the U.S. include computers and equipment (export value: USD 10.568 billion), Telephones, Equipment, and Components (USD 4.657 billion), Rubber Products (USD 4.504 billion), Semiconductor, Transistors, and Diodes (USD 2.484 billion), Transformers and Components (USD 2.096 billion). Other notable export products include Machinery and Components, Gems and Jewelry, Automotive and Parts, Electrical Appliances and Components, and Air Conditioners and Components.




The implementation of U.S. tariff measures has a <u>direct impact on Thailand's export sector</u> as follows:

- Steel and Steel Products, for which the U.S. is the top export market, and Aluminum and Aluminum Products, where the U.S. is the second largest export market (after China), will face an increase in tariffs to 25% starting from March 12, 2025. In 2024, Thailand's exports of these products to the U.S. were valued at 1.205 billion USD.
- Automotives and Parts will also face a tariff increase to 25%, effective from April 2, 2025. In 2024, Thailand exported 1.893 billion USD worth of these goods to the U.S., representing 6.1% of Thailand's total automotive exports. However, the increase in U.S. import tariffs will also affect exports of Thai automotive parts to other countries that use these parts to manufacture vehicles for export to the U.S., such as Mexico and Japan, which respectively exported 2.5 million and 1.3 million cars to the U.S. last year.
- All Products (except copper and copper products, pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, semiconductors, processed wood, gold bars, energy, and certain rare minerals) will see a 10% tariff increase, effective April 5, 2025. However, this is not expected to significantly reduce Thailand's price competitiveness, as all countries will be equally affected by this baseline tariff increase.
- The implementation of reciprocal tariffs at a rate of 37%, effective April 9, 2025, could take four potential possibles, as outlined below:
  - Possible 1: All products currently subject to a 10% tariff (Baseline Tariff) will be subject to the reciprocal tariff rate of 37%.
  - O <u>Possible 2: All products</u> currently subject to a 10% tariff (Baseline Tariff) will see an additional reciprocal tariff of 37%, bringing the total tariff to 47% (10% + 37%).
  - O <u>Possible 3: Certain products</u> will be subject to a reciprocal tariff of 37%, while other products will retain the baseline tariff rate of 10%.
  - O <u>Possible 4: Certain products</u> will have an additional reciprocal tariff, making the total tariff 47%, while other products will retain the baseline tariff rate of 10%.

It is anticipated that the tariff collection will follow a net rate similar to the measures implemented during President Trump's first term, specifically Possible 1, where all products will be subject to a 37% tariff. Regarding Possible 3 and 4, where reciprocal tariffs are applied to specific product categories, it is expected that products at risk of being subject to these measures include electrical appliances (e.g., refrigerators, washing machines, air conditioners), electronic equipment (e.g., integrated circuit, computers, HDDs), machinery and equipment, agricultural and processed food products (e.g., rice, processed seafood, fruits, processed fruits), rubber, rubber products, plastic products, and furniture. Thailand has a significant trade surplus with the U.S. in these categories. The increased import tariffs are expected to reduce the price competitiveness of Thai products, potentially leading to a loss of market share to competitor countries that are not affected by the U.S. reciprocal tariffs or are subject to lower reciprocal tariffs than Thailand.



Figure 3: Impact of U.S. Reciprocal Tariff Measures on Thai Exports to the United States



Source: LH Bank Business Research analysis based on data from USTR, Capital Economics, Goldman Sachs, MOC

## Indirect Impact

## 1) Impact through Supply Chain Linkages between Thailand and China

The indirect impact of increased import tariffs on Chinese goods will lead to a reduction in Thailand's exports to China. This is due to Thailand's role as part of China's production supply chain, particularly in exporting raw materials and intermediate goods that China imports to manufacture products for export to the U.S. According to data from the Ministry of Commerce (MOC), in 2024, the top 10 product categories exported by Thailand to China were valued at USD 17.195.9 billion, accounting for 48.8% of the total value of Thailand's exports to China. When broken down by product, the top five goods with high dependency on the Chinese market include cassava products, which account for 51.4% of the total value of Thailand's exports to China, followed by wood and wood products (43.2%), rubber (29.8%), copper and copper products (25.5%), plastic pellets (25.2%), and aluminum products. These product categories are expected to be impacted by a potential reduction in exports to the U.S. market.

<u>Table 1</u>: The export value of Thailand's to China that are likely to be affected by the U.S. import tariff increases.

Products	TH exports to CN	TH exports to CN	%YoY		% of Total
Products	2024 (USD mn)	2M2025 (USD mn)	2024	2M2025	TH exports
Primary and Intermediate Goods					
Rubber products	3,098.28	670.92	7.8	61.9	21.8
Computers and equipment	2,954.08	632.76	65.8	114.9	12.0
Plastic resin	2,245.10	350.76	-10.3	-2.1	25.5
Cassava products	1,609.69	237.32	-31.3	-10.1	51.4
Rubber	1,498.71	449.34	6.2	79.0	30.0
Wood products	1,490.86	234.96	2.3	-9.4	43.2

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Products	TH exports to CN	TH exports to CN	%YoY		% of Total
Products	2024 (USD mn)	2M2025 (USD mn)	2024	2M2025	TH exports
Chemical products	1,428.86	253.91	14.3	50.8	17.0
Copper and articles thereof	1,154.54	222.89	18.8	32.6	29.8
Machinery and parts	885.71	85.43	62.4	2.5	8.6
Aluminum products	830.02	219.01	60.5	93.6	25.2
Total 10 products	17,195.85	3,357.30	9.8	41.4	20.2
% of Total 10 products exports to CN (2024)		48.8%			
% of Total TH exports (2024)	5.7%				

Source: LH Bank Business Research analysis based on data from MOC

## 2) Impact from the Risk of Chinese Goods Flooding into ASEAN and Thai Markets

According to data from the MOC, Chinese goods currently account for approximately 26.3% of Thailand's total import value. Furthermore, in recent years, Chinese exports to Thailand have significantly increased, rising from USD 50.27 billion in 2019 to USD 80.61 billion in 2024, representing a growth of over 1.6 times, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of approximately 9.9%. The top 10 imported goods from China have continued to expand, particularly in the categories of electrical machinery and components, machinery and parts, chemicals, electrical circuits, metal ores and scrap metal, as well as plastic products.

As China's exports to the U.S. are constrained by tariff barriers, including the original 20% import duty announced on March 4, 2025, and an additional 34% reciprocal tariff, China is likely to divert its goods to other markets, particularly ASEAN, a neighboring region with economic potential and demand for low-cost products. The goods most at risk of flooding into the region and Thailand include electrical appliances and components (such as refrigerators, washing machines, air conditioners), computers and equipment, vehicles and parts, machinery and components, petrochemicals (such as plastic pellets), as well as steel, aluminum, and steel and aluminum products. The consequence of this situation is that domestic and regional competition in ASEAN will intensify, as manufacturers face increasing market share competition from cheap Chinese goods. Thai and ASEAN producers will be heavily affected by the market flooding of Chinese goods, which have lower production costs and excess production capacity, forcing them to engage in intense price competition to maintain market share.

<u>Table 2</u>: Thailand's imports of goods from China, 2019-2024.

Rank	Imports from China	Import Value (USD million)						
Kalik	imports from Cilina	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	(%)
1	Electrical machinery and components	6,353.4	7,037.8	8,264.2	9,078.7	8,760.7	11,116.7	11.8%
2	Machinery and components	5,140.9	5,301.7	6,401.1	6,414.8	6,570.8	8,160.3	9.7%
3	Household electrical appliances	4,812.4	4,884.3	6,849.2	5,914.0	5,808.5	6,199.7	5.2%
4	Chemical products	3,722.5	3,646.1	5,626.3	6,540.6	6,033.8	5,965.1	9.9%
5	Computers and equipment	3,516.9	3,671.2	4,960.2	4,174.7	3,844.7	4,755.7	6.2%

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Rank	luna auta fira na China	Import Value (USD million)						
Rank	Imports from China	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	(%)
6	Steel and steel products	2,675.0	2,502.1	4,016.0	3,945.7	3,801.3	4,003.1	8.4%
7	Other metal ores, scrap	1,823.5	1,572.6	2,744.8	3,053.2	2,974.7	3,396.9	13.2%
	metal and related products							
8	Metal products	1,523.4	1,532.0	1,990.9	2,340.2	2,366.9	2,756.5	12.6%
9	Integrated circuits	954.7	1,249.4	1,763.3	2,470.8	1,983.4	2,538.3	21.6%
10	Plastic products	1,535.4	1,664.6	2,056.1	2,163.5	2,236.0	2,523.8	10.5%
	Others	18,212.5	16,738.9	22,086.3	24,670.5	26,445.8	29,191.9	9.9%
	All products	50,270.6	49,800.7	66,758.4	70,766.7	70,826.6	80,608.0	9.9%

Source: LH Bank Business Research analysis based on data from MOC

## 3) Impact of Global Economic Slowdown

The global economic slowdown, exacerbated by the U.S. tariff measures and ongoing trade wars, may negatively affect Thailand's exports, including primary, intermediate, and final goods, to markets outside of the United States. According to the MOC, Thailand's key trading partners in 2024 (excluding the U.S., which accounts for 18.3% of total exports and is ranked 1st) include China (ranked 2nd), Japan (ranked 3rd), Australia (ranked 5th), ASEAN countries (particularly Malaysia ranked 4th, Vietnam ranked 6th, Singapore ranked 9th, and Indonesia ranked 10th), India (ranked 7th), and Hong Kong (ranked 8th). If an economic slowdown occurs in these partner countries, it will significantly impact the exports of products such as automotive and parts, Computers and equipment, integrated circuits, refined petroleum, gems and jewelry, chemical products, and plastic resins. These are major export items to several countries in this group. At the same time, agricultural and processed agricultural products, such as fresh and processed fruits, processed chicken, cassava products, and rubber products, may also be affected by the economic slowdown in China and Japan.

Table 3: Impact of Global Economic Slowdown on Thailand's Exports (Excluding the United States)

Rank	Thailand's Trade Partners	Export Value 2024 (USD million)	Share (%)	Thailand's Top 5 Main Export Products to Trading Partner <sup>1/</sup>
2	China	35,243.3	11.7	1. Fresh, chilled, frozen, and dried fruits (16.2%)
				2. Rubber products (8.8%)
				3. Computers and equipment (8.4%)
				4. Plastic resins (6.4%)
				5. Cassava products (4.6%)
3	Japan	23,285.8	7.8	1. Automotive and parts (8.4%)
				2. Processed chicken (6.0%)
				3. Electrical appliances and components (4.3%)
				4. Machinery and components (4.2%)
				5. Chemical products (3.7%)
4	Malaysia	12,335.2	4.1	1. Automotive and parts (11.8%)
	,			2. Refined petroleum (8.5%)
				3. Integrated circuits (6.1%)
				4. Other manufacturing products (6.0%)
				5. Computers and equipment (4.7%)
5	Australia	12,329.5	4.1	1. Automotive and parts (52.5%)

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Rank	Thailand's	Export Value 2024	Share (%)	Thailand's Top 5 Main Export Products
IXalik	Trade Partners	(USD million)	Silare (70)	to Trading Partner 1/
				2. Air conditioners and components (5.5%)
				3. Plastic resins (3.4%)
				4. Rubber products (3.1%)
				5. Plastic resins (2.9%)
6	Vietnam	11,770.4	3.9	1. Automotive and parts (12.8%)
				2. Refined petroleum (7.9%)
				3. Plastic resins (6.3%)
				4. Chemical products (5.8%)
				5. Air conditioners and components (5.1%)
7	India	11,755.1	3.9	1. Chemical products (12.4%)
				2. Gems and jewelry (11.0%)
				3. Plastic resins (9.1%)
				4. Animal and vegetable fats and oils (6.8%)
				5. Machinery and components (5.6%)
8	Hong Kong	10,851.4	3.6	1. Gems and jewelry (26.3%)
				2. Integrated circuits (19.6%)
				3. Computers and equipment (13.3%)
				4. Telephones, equipment, and components (8.0%)
				5. Semiconductor, transistors, and diodes (2.7%)
9	Singapore	10,363.8	3.5	1. Gems and jewelry (18.8%)
				2. Refined petroleum (14.0%)
				3. Computers and equipment (10.0%)
				4. Other manufacturing products (8.9%)
				5. Gems and jewelry (8.4%)
10	Indonesia	9,471.9	3.2	1. Automotive and parts (14.0%)
				2. Plastic resins (9.9%)
				3. Rice (8.3%)
				4. Machinery and components (6.3%)
				5. Chemical products (5.9%)
	Total 10 countries	135,710.0	47.6	
	Total Export	285,074.3	53.4	

Note: 1/ The numbers in parentheses represent the trade value share of Thailand's main export products in each market in 2024. Source: LH Bank Business Research analysis based on data from MOC

## 4) Impact of Increased Exports of Certain Product Categories to the U.S.

When analyzing Thailand's comparative advantage after the implementation of U.S. reciprocal tariffs, significant changes in the competitive structure were found, particularly in comparison with key regional competitors such as Vietnam. Thailand's comparative advantage in certain product categories, especially in high-value technology and electronics exports, has increased:

- Telephones, equipment, and components (12.5% of exports to the U.S.): Thailand is taxed at 37%, while Vietnam is taxed at 46%. This tariff difference could lead U.S. importers to shift their orders to Thailand.
- Computers and equipment (11.1% of exports): Thailand benefits from a lower tariff than Vietnam, which could allow Thailand to expand its exports in this category, particularly as Thailand already has a strong supporting industry.

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■ **Tires** (6.4% of exports): Thailand has a competitive edge in terms of raw materials and expertise in tire manufacturing.

On the other hand, there are product categories where Thailand may become less competitive, including:

- Gems and jewelry: Thailand may lose market share to countries like Japan, China, and India, which benefit from lower tariffs. However, Thailand's strength in quality and craftsmanship could help maintain its share in the high-end market, where quality is valued over price.
- Air Conditioners: Thailand is taxed at a higher rate than South Korea, which may reduce its competitiveness, especially in the high-end air conditioner market where South Korean products are prevalent.
- Printers: Thailand may lose out to Malaysia, which enjoys a lower tariff. If Malaysia can expand its production capacity and improve product quality, it could further reduce Thailand's market share in the long term.
- Rice: Despite being a key agricultural product for Thailand, the higher tariff compared to countries like India and Pakistan could reduce Thailand's price competitiveness in the U.S. rice market.

Although no conclusion has been reached yet, there is a possibility that the announcement of import tariff increases by President Trump could lead to an intensified trade war, particularly with countries severely impacted, such as China. Recently, China has announced retaliatory tariffs against the U.S., which could present an opportunity for Thailand to replace certain exports to the U.S. that were previously supplied by China. These could include automotive parts, electrical appliances and components, machinery parts, clothing, jewelry, cosmetics, seasonings, and beverages. If the trade war between the two countries intensifies further, it could lead to trade diversion, with the U.S. turning to other countries for imports instead of China.

## 5) Impact of Investment Relocation and Reshoring

## 5.1) Impact of Investment Relocation


In 2024, Thailand experienced a notable surge in foreign direct investment (FDI), with approved investment value reaching THB 727.1 billion, marking a 32%YoY increase. The number of approved projects totaled 1,910, reflecting a 43% rise from the previous year. Among these, the majority of foreign-invested projects were concentrated in the machinery and automotive sectors (420 projects, or 22% of total approved foreign projects), followed by electrical appliances and electronics (349 projects, or 18%) and the metal and materials industry (271 projects, or 14%).

However, the United States imposed a 37% import tariff on Thai products—while maintained lower rates for competing countries such as Taiwan, Indonesia, or Malaysia. This would create a strong incentive for manufacturers to relocate their production bases out of Thailand to avoid the high tariff burden. Such a scenario could have a significant impact on future FDI decisions, particularly in export-oriented industries with a high dependency on the U.S. market, including electronics and components, machinery, textiles, and apparel. Investors with existing plans to invest in Thailand may reconsider or delay their decisions, while those with current operations in Thailand may consider relocating to countries with lower import tariff costs to mitigate excessive tax burdens. The potential loss of FDI would also affect employment creation,



domestic technological advancement, and Thailand's competitiveness in the global supply chain. In the absence of appropriate policy responses—such as new trade agreements or enhanced investment incentives—Thailand risks losing investor confidence over the long term.

Figure 4: Thailand's Foreign Direct Investment Value in 2024



Source: LH Bank Business Research analysis based on data from BOI (Data as of February 2025)

Figure 5: Top 10 Sources of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Approved for Investment Promotion in 2024

	Top 10 FDI Approval by Country in 2024								
Rank	Country	Number of Projects	Investment Value (THB, mn)	US Reciprocal Tariffs (%)					
1	Singapore	264	224,362	10					
2	China	743	174,440	34					
3	Hong Kong	146	71,365	34					
4	Netherlands	46	57,214	20					
5	Japan	295	62,304	24					
6	Taiwan	117	51,873	32					
7	United States	62	30,575	-					
8	Australia	22	19,255	10					
9	Ireland	5	8,814	20					
10	Indonesia	5	7,865	32					

Source: LH Bank Business Research analysis based on data from BOI (Data as of February 2025)

Nevertheless, the relocation of production bases may not occur due to various costs and operational complexities. These include the high capital requirements for establishing new facilities abroad, such as infrastructure development, utility systems, and legal compliance costs. While labor costs might be lower in certain alternative destinations, labor productivity might also be lower, potentially increasing the cost of production. In contrast, developed economies such as Singapore offer robust infrastructure but are burdened by significantly higher labor costs, making long-term relocation less economically viable. Moreover,

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the complexity of supply chain realignment further delays relocation efforts. The establishment of new supplier networks requires time and additional expenditure, while regulatory and political risks in destination countries can jeopardize business stability. For instance, stringent environmental regulations may raise operating costs, and political uncertainty may lead to abrupt policy shifts affecting investment incentives. In addition, Thai factories that have already invested in automation and renewable energy may enjoy lower unit production costs compared to starting operations anew in other countries, thus increasing the break-even threshold for relocation.

## 5.2) Potential Reshoring by U.S. Companies Operating in Thailand

In the event that Thai exports are subjected to a steep 37% import tariff, U.S.-based companies that have established manufacturing bases in Thailand may reassess their cost structures. If the combined costs of tariffs and logistics are deemed higher than domestic production costs, these companies may opt to reshore their operations back to the United States. Industries most at risk of such a shift include the hard disk drive (HDD) and electronic component sectors, which are heavily impacted by tariff measures and have seen significant U.S. investment — exemplified by firms such as Western Digital and Seagate. However, reshoring is generally a more complex and time-consuming process than relocating production within the region. Several structural and operational constraints contribute to the difficulty, including underdeveloped infrastructure, limited supply chain networks, and notably higher labor costs in the U.S. Furthermore, many U.S. firms have recently expanded their investments in Thailand, particularly in high-value fixed assets such as advanced manufacturing facilities, machinery, and production lines — representing capital expenditures in the tens of billions of baht. These substantial sunk costs make reshoring a less attractive option in the short term. In addition, U.S. companies benefit from Thailand's skilled workforce and wellestablished supply chain ecosystems that have been developed over decades. As a result, rather than fully withdrawing from Thailand, the majority of U.S. companies are expected to adopt adaptive business strategies — such as product reclassification, supply chain restructuring, or partial relocation — to mitigate the impact of elevated tariffs while maintaining a presence in Thailand.

## Implication:

## Key Implications for Thai Industries

We expect that several core Thai industries will be significantly impacted by the recent U.S. tariff measures. These include: 1) Electrical appliances and components (e.g., refrigerators, washing machines, air conditioners, televisions), 2) Computers and equipment, 3) Automotives and parts, 4) Machinery and components, 5) Petrochemicals and plastics (e.g., plastic resins, plastic products), 6) Agricultural products and processed food (e.g., fresh fruits, processed fruits—chilled/frozen, frozen seafood, rice, cassava products), 7) Steel, aluminum, and related products, and 8) Rubber and rubber products. The key implications for each industry are summarized as follows:

 Electrical appliances and components: This industry faces dual challenges — from competition in the U.S. and within ASEAN. <u>In the U.S. market, Thai goods are subject to a</u> reciprocal tariff rate of up to 37%, which is higher than those imposed on key competitors such

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as China (34%), Mexico (10%), and Japan (24%). This is particularly concerning for air conditioners, a major Thai export to the U.S., as the tariff disadvantage may render Thai products uncompetitive and result in significant market share losses. However, opportunities remain in certain segments such as televisions, where key competitor Vietnam is subject to even higher tariff rates. Within ASEAN, Thai producers also face rising competition due to trade diversion from China, intensifying domestic and regional market pressures. Thai exporters may need to diversify into alternative markets such as Europe or the Middle East to mitigate risk. Smaller players and SMEs, unable to compete on cost, must differentiate through quality, technology, integrated service models, and target premium segments.

- 2) Computers and equipment: Thailand heavily relies on imported parts, especially from China and Taiwan. Cost increases from these suppliers may raise production expenses for Thai firms. Meanwhile, higher U.S. tariffs on Thai goods compared to those on competitors such as Mexico, China, Japan, and South Korea could weaken Thailand's competitiveness. The industry also faces a surge in Chinese products being redirected to the region and the risk of transshipment accusations, and, consequently, heightened scrutiny from the U.S. These developments may accelerate Thailand's transition toward becoming a hub for advanced electronics manufacturing (e.g., semiconductors) to reduce exposure to tariff risks.
- Automotives and parts: The flooding of Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) into Thailand and ASEAN due to U.S. market restrictions poses a significant threat to local internal combustion engine (ICE) manufacturers, potentially eroding domestic and regional market share. Additionally, the economic slowdown in China and Japan, with whom Thailand is closely integrated in the automotive supply chain, further exacerbates vulnerabilities, particularly for Thai firms that produce ICE parts for Japanese automakers. On the upside, Chinese EV manufacturers may increase investment in Thailand and ASEAN to establish export bases to the U.S. Thai suppliers must urgently adapt by training workers in EV technologies, collaborating with leading EV firms (e.g., from China and Japan), and building capabilities to produce both ICE and EV components locally.
- 4) Machinery and components: This sector may experience both positive and negative impacts. On the positive side, Thailand may benefit from importing high-tech machinery that it cannot yet produce domestically. However, local manufacturers, especially those producing general-purpose machinery, will face heightened price competition. The slowdown in regional investment due to global economic uncertainty may also reduce demand for new machinery and slow Thai exports. Thai firms should adopt proactive strategies developing expertise in specialized, high-value machinery with less competition, and offering value-added services such as preventive maintenance and integrated production efficiency consulting.
- Petrochemicals and plastics: This industry may face intense pressure from China's excess production capacity and product dumping, particularly in plastic resins and products. This



could drive market prices down and compress Thai producers' profit margins. Concurrently, a global economic slowdown may dampen demand in downstream industries, further worsening oversupply. However, Thai downstream plastic manufacturers could benefit from cheaper input costs. Therefore, Thai petrochemical firms should focus on developing high-value specialty plastics (e.g., for medical and advanced electronics applications) and explore new export markets in regions such as India, South Asia, and the Middle East to reduce overdependence on traditional markets affected by U.S. tariffs.

- 6) Agricultural products and processed food: Processed seafood exports to the U.S. are directly affected by the tariffs. Moreover, Thai rice faces higher U.S. tariffs compared to competitors like India (27%), undermining its competitiveness. The slowdown in China also reduces Thai exports of fresh/processed fruits and cassava products. Furthermore, Thailand may be compelled to amend or remove certain non-tariff barriers (NTBs) deemed by the U.S. as trade obstacles, as part of negotiations to reduce reciprocal tariffs potentially increasing imports from the U.S. in this sector and heightening domestic competition. Thai producers should reduce reliance on the U.S. and China by diversify their market focus, targeting emerging markets like India, the Middle East, and ASEAN, and strengthen domestic market strategies by building strong local brands, appealing to consumers who prefer Thai products, and expanding e-commerce channels.
- 7) Steel, aluminum, and related products: Thai producers are at risk from China's aggressive dumping of low-priced steel and aluminum, stemming from its massive overcapacity. This will pressure Thai producers to lower prices and margins or even incur losses in extreme cases. The global industrial slowdown, particularly in automotive and related sectors, may further reduce demand. Thai steel and aluminum firms should transform from manufacturers to integrated solution providers, focusing on high-value niche markets and improving environmental preparedness in anticipation measures of related to carbon emission.
- 8) Rubber and rubber products: Finished rubber goods from China, such as gloves, tires, and industrial rubber parts, may increasingly flood the Thai market. At the same time, the global automotive industry slowdown, exacerbated by trade tensions and U.S. tariffs, could suppress demand for tires and parts, dragging down natural rubber prices a key Thai agricultural export. Notably, competitors like Vietnam are also affected by U.S. tariffs, potentially leveling the playing field. Thai producers should brace for the surge of Chinese products and focus on upgrading to high-value niche markets such as medical-grade rubber and eco-friendly rubber materials. These strategies should include alignment with global sustainability standards, environmental regulations, and EUDR requirements, including traceability and contamination control.)

## Key Implications for Thai SMEs

In 2024, the export value of Thai SMEs totaled USD 39.35 billion, accounting for 13.1% of Thailand's total merchandise exports. Of this, exports to the United States amounted to USD 7.63 billion,



representing 19.4% of total SME exports. A breakdown by product category reveals that electrical equipment and parts were the leading export to the U.S. market, valued at USD 3.23 billion, which accounted for 42.3% of all SME exports to the U.S. and 51.6% of global exports of this product group by SMEs. In addition, several other products—though contributing a smaller share of overall SME exports — exhibit a high dependency on the U.S. market. These include furniture, articles made of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica, or similar materials, and aircraft, spacecraft, and related parts, among others. These product groups are expected to be significantly impacted by the recent increases in U.S. import tariffs, due to their heavy reliance on the American market.

Share of SME Export Value to The U.S. Top 15 SME Export to The U.S. % of the U.S SME Export to % of SME Export HS Code SME the U.S. to the U.S. Global 7,634.18 85 Electrical Equipment and parts 3,229.51 42.3 51.6 19.4% 2 71 854.39 11.2 15.8 Machinery and parts 84 845.51 11.1 24.7 Furniture 434.75 5.7 62.6 39 Plastic and plastic products 301.74 4.0 24.3 73 Iron or steel thereof 196.88 2.6 26.6 2024 87 176.97 2.3 16.9 39,347.38 68 Of plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar objects 95.89 million USD 93.35 1.2 16.4 Optical parts and accessories 10 44 Wood and Wood products 89.85 1.2 7.7 Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk 11 19 89.62 1.2 18.2 12 88 83.80 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 40.6 Large 13 76 79.74 31,713.20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts 74.72 1.0 13.8 80.6% 15 74.23 Toy, games and sports requisites 1.0 33.0 Other 913.23 12.0 5.6 7,634.18 100.0 19.4

Figure 6: SME Export Value to the U.S. Market in 2024

Source: LH Bank Business Research analysis based on data from MOC and OSMEP

## A Guide to Preparing for U.S. Tariff Measures for Thailand

The Thai government and private sector should prepare and plan strategically to address U.S. import tariffs and reciprocal tariffs. This preparation aims to minimize negative impacts and seek new opportunities in the challenging trade environment. Key strategies include:

The government of Thailand should accelerate discussions with the U.S. to reach agreements on reducing the trade deficit through diplomatic and trade negotiation for three key points: The first is to reduce U.S. tariffs on products imported by Thailand, particularly those that do not significantly affect domestic industries. The second is to increase imports from the U.S. to reduce the trade deficit, such as agricultural products, energy goods, weapons, and machinery. The third is to join "Friend Shoring" initiatives, allowing Thailand and the U.S. In addition, Thailand and the U.S. should collaborate in industries with mutual potential for sustainable growth, such as agriculture-food, where Thailand can import agricultural products for processing and export globally, and the high-tech industry, where Thailand is a major producer of hard disk drives (HDD), crucial for the development of U.S. data centers and Al industries. Furthermore, Thailand could leverage this opportunity to address issues identified as trade barriers and seek joint solutions, particularly regarding standards for hygiene and plant health, as well as the maximum residue levels (MRLs) for U.S. meat



products. This could help reduce trade tensions and may lead to a review or relaxation of reciprocal tariff measures in the future. In addition, Thailand should also focus on improving other non-tariff barriers (NTBs), such as simplifying import procedures, improving inspection systems, and enhancing customs processes to ensure faster and more transparent operations. Thailand also could negotiate to increase imports from the U.S. in exchange for lower tariffs, which could mitigate the impact of U.S. reciprocal tariffs. Finally, the Thai government should implement financial support measures for exporters and businesses affected by U.S. tariff measures. These measures could include the establishment of a fund to assist exporters, the provision of low-interest loans to enhance production efficiency or offering tax relief to help businesses cope with higher costs and maintain competitiveness in the U.S. market.

For Thai private sector, Thai exporters should consider adjusting marketing strategies and pricing to maintain competitiveness in the U.S. market despite higher import tariffs. This may involve reducing production costs through efficiency improvements, adopting new technologies, or modifying product components to fall into categories less affected by tariffs. Thai businesses should explore new and rapidly growing markets, particularly in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa. Opportunities could be found by participating in international trade shows and networking with importers in new target markets, thus diversifying risk and accessing markets unaffected by U.S. import tariff measures. Thai manufacturers with potential could consider expanding investments abroad, particularly in countries with free trade agreements with the U.S., which could help avoid or reduce the impact of U.S. reciprocal tariffs and provide access to local and regional markets. In addition, to enhance long-term competitiveness, Thai entrepreneurs should focus on developing innovative products and services with added value, such as investing in research and development, product design, and branding. This could help businesses become more resilient to changes in U.S. tariff measures and other trade regulations in the future.

For the banking and financial sector, they should assess the risks and vulnerabilities of their loan portfolios, particularly for industries heavily reliant on exports to the U.S., such as automotive, electronics, and appliances. They should consider revising loan approval criteria for businesses in these sectors and increase provisions for potential bad debts. Financial institutions should develop products that help manage exchange rates and liquidity risks for businesses engaged in international trade, such as derivatives, foreign exchange hedging, and forward contracts. In addition, in the long term, financial institutions should provide financing options that support the adaptation and transformation of Thai businesses, such as loans for investing in technology and innovation, supporting production expansion in free trade agreement countries, and offering supply chain finance products to assist suppliers impacted by tariffs. Moreover, banks should provide consultation services and educate customers, especially SMEs, on international finance, changing trade regulations, and tax policies. This would help businesses adjust to challenges and take advantage of new opportunities in the volatile global trade environment.

**Source:** USTR, The White House, Goldman Sachs, Bloomberg, Reuters <u>1</u> <u>2</u>, Capital Economics <u>1</u> <u>2</u> <u>3</u>, Nomura, Global Times <u>1</u> <u>2</u>, Ministry of Commerce, Office of SMEs Promotion, <u>Business Standard</u>, <u>Bangkok</u> Post, The Standard, Matichon, Thansettakij, Bangkokbiznews 1 2



# Appendix: Comparison on Reciprocal Tariffs Imposed on Thailand's key exports to the United States.

Rank	HS Code	Products	TH export to US (USD mn)	% Total	% Share to	Major Supplier of US	% Share in US Market	US Reciprocal Tariffs (%)
1	8517	Telephone sets,	6,846.50	12.5	7.7	1.China	44.7	34
		including				2.Vietnam	12.7	46
		smartphones and				3.Mexico	9.3	10
		other telephones				4.India	7.8	27
						5.Thailand	7.7	37
2	8417	Computers and	6,093.20	11.1	4.9	1.Mexico	34.5	10
		equipment				2.China	25.8	34
						3.Taiwan	18.6	32
						4.Vietnam	11.3	46
						5.Thailand	4.9	37
3	4011	Tyres rubber	3,513.00	6.4	19.3	1.Thailand	19.3	37
						2.Mexico	11.5	10
						3.Canada	9.9	10
						4.Japan	7.8	24
						5.Vietnam	7.3	46
4	8541	Diodes, transistors,	2,472.50	4.5	15.5	1.Vietnam	24.9	46
		and semi-conductor				2.Thailand	15.5	37
		devices				3.Malaysia	14.4	24
						4.India	7.2	27
						5.Cambodia	6.0	49
5	8504	Electrical	2,088.60	3.8	8.3	1.Mexico	21.1	10
		transformers				2.China	13.2	34
						3.Thailand	8.3	37
						4.South Korea	6.2	26
						5.Vietnam	5.5	46
6	8473	Machinery and parts	1,501.70	2.7	2.9	1.Taiwan	46.0	32
						2.South Korea	12.9	26
						3.China	12.0	34
						4.Vietnam	11.6	46
						5.Malaysia	7.0	24
7	8708	Automotive parts	1,404.40	2.6	1.4	1.Mexico	41.3	10
						2.Canada	12.9	10
						3.China	10.7	34
						4.Japan	8.2	24
						5.South Korea	7.3	26

## **Business Research**

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## Disclaimer



Rank	HS	Products	TH export to US	% Total	% Share to	Major Supplier	% Share in	US Reciprocal
runk	Code	Troude	(USD mn)	exports to US	US Market	of US	US Market	Tariffs (%)
8	7113	Jewelry	1,387.30	2.5	8.7	1.India	24.1	27
						2.France	12.8	20
						3.ltary	12.6	20
						4.Thailand	8.7	37
						5.Jordan	6.5	20
9	8415	Air Conditioner	1,273.70	2.3	9.0	1.Mexico	50.1	10
						2.China	19.3	34
						3.Thailand	9.0	37
						4.Canada	8.8	10
						5.South Korea	2.6	26
10	8525	Radio Transmission	1,107.00	2.0	11.8	1.Vietnam	21.9	46
						2.China	17.2	34
						3.Thailand	11.8	37
						4.Japan	8.1	24
						5.Taiwan	7.6	32
11	8443	Printer	1,053.40	1.9	10.2	1.Japan	22.1	24
						2.Malaysia	17.6	24
						3.China	12.5	34
						4.Thailand	10.2	37
						5.Vietnam	8.5	46
12	2309	Preparations of a	870.5	1.6	26.2	1.Thailand	26.2	37
		kind used in animal				2.Canada	22.6	10
		feeding				3.China	8.2	34
						4.Indonesia	4.9	32
						5.Mexico	4.3	10
13	8537	Boards, panels,	861.4	1.6	1.7	1.Mexico	42.2	10
		consoles, desks,				2.Canada	9.7	10
		cabinets and other				3.China	6.4	34
		bases, equipped with two or more				4.Germany	6.2	20
		apparatus of				5.South Korea	4.1	26
		heading						
14	1006	Rice	797.6	1.5	53.6	1.Thailand	53.6	37
						2.India	26.5	27
						3.China	3.8	34
						4.Pakistan	3.6	29
						5.Vietnam	1.9	46

## **Business Research**

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## Disclaime



Rank	HS Code	Products	TH export to US (USD mn)	% Total exports to US	% Share to	Major Supplier of US	% Share in US Market	US Reciprocal Tariffs (%)
15	8418	Refrigerators,	742.0	1.4	2.6	1.China	22.6	34
		freezers and other				2.Mexico	21.6	10
		refrigerating				3.Japan	8.4	24
		equipment				4.Germany	8.2	20
						5.South Korea	4.9	26

Source: LH Bank Business Research analysis based on data from MOC

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